Title
Buyers’ welfare maximizing auction design: comment
Author
Abstract
In an earlier paper published in this journal, Bauer (2023) claims to have constructed an auction format that maximizes buyers’ welfare. We note that the characterization of such a mechanism in Proposition 1 of Bauer (2023) is incomplete because it does not precisely specify the payment rule. Because of that, the discussion following this proposition is misleading and the mechanism proposed in the example is not incentive compatible. The complete characterization of the optimal mechanism is the one from Krishna and Perry (1998).
Keywords
Auction designEfficiencyBuyers’ welfareNon-negative payments
Object type
Language
English [eng]
Persistent identifier
Appeared in
Title
International Journal of Game Theory
Volume
53
Issue
3
ISSN
0020-7276
Issued
2024
From page
1073
To page
1075
Publication
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Version type
Date issued
2024
Access rights
Rights
Rights statement
© The Author(s) 2024
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