Title
Emotions in misinformation studies: distinguishing affective state from emotional response and misinformation recognition from acceptance
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Abstract
Prior studies indicate that emotions, particularly high-arousal emotions, may elicit rapid intuitive thinking, thereby decreasing the ability to recognize misinformation. Yet, few studies have distinguished prior affective states from emotional reactions to false news, which could influence belief in falsehoods in different ways. Extending a study by Martel et al. (Cognit Res: Principles Implic 5: 1–20, 2020), we conducted a pre-registered online survey experiment in Austria (N = 422), investigating associations of emotions and discernment of false and real news related to COVID-19. We found no associations of prior affective state with discernment, but observed higher anger and less joy in response to false compared to real news. Exploratory analyses, including automated analyses of open-ended text responses, suggested that anger arose for different reasons in different people depending on their prior beliefs. In our educated and left-leaning sample, higher anger was often related to recognizing the misinformation as such, rather than accepting the false claims. We conclude that studies need to distinguish between prior affective state and emotional response to misinformation and consider individuals’ prior beliefs as determinants of emotions.
Keywords
MisinformationEmotionAngerDiscernmentRecognitionBeliefCOVID-19
Object type
Language
English [eng]
Persistent identifier
Appeared in
Title
Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications
Volume
9
ISSN
2365-7464
Issued
2024
Publication
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Version type
Date issued
2024
Access rights
Rights
Rights statement
© The Author(s) 2024
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