



The Emergence of the Concept of “Ethnic Group” in Taiwan  
and the Role of Taiwan’s Austronesians in the Construction of  
Taiwanese Identity

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Keywords:

Taiwan Aborigines; Austronesians; nativism; cultural memory; cultural revitalization; ethnic group; nationalist discourse; Taiwan history.

Abstract:

On March 12, 1996, the newly elected Taipei city mayor Chen Shuibian announced that the street in front of the president’s palace in Taipei – “Long live Chiang Kai-shek Road” – had been renamed to “Ketagalan Avenue”. The Ketagalan were one of the Aboriginal groups in Taiwan that had assimilated to Han society long before.

In his reflections on the structures of collective memory, Jan Assmann contends that after a period of 40 years the memory of a generation of people with shared experiences comes to a critical stage. After this period those who were witnesses of significant events as adults, gradually step out of professional life. When they die, their memory – or better, the “social frame” in which their memory was organized – vanishes, and certain aspects that

have not been transformed into cultural memory yet may fall into – or may be left to – oblivion.

If we look at Taiwan, Taiwanese Han elites have showed tremendous efforts to reconstruct collective memory since the end of the 1980s – exactly those years when Mainlander elites’ memory had begun to wither away and other memories had the chance to take over. The notion of “Taiwan’s fate community” – a concept that was established by Taiwan’s opposition party in 1989 – as well as the notion of “Taiwan’s life community” put forward by the central figure of Taiwanese Nationalist Party (KMT) elites, Li Denghui, shortly afterwards – converged into a long-term community renaissance policy after 1992, which “in a time of national identity crisis in Taiwan had the main purpose to refocus people’s identity on Taiwan and let the people’s original collective memory reorganize and reappear”. In this project, all communities in Taiwan – ethnic, rural and urban communities, most of which were either Hoklo, Hakka or Aboriginal – were asked to participate actively in local cultural life, to organize rites and festivals, and to engage in the preservation of local culture and the collection of oral history.

My article explores the role of Taiwan’s Aborigines in this process of memory reconstruction in Taiwan since the lifting of martial law. The emergence of the notion of “ethnic group” in Taiwan and the construction of “the four great ethnic groups” were important steps in this endeavour. By shifting the focus away from the “Chinese nation” to distinct “cultural” and “ethnic groups”, the framework in which people had forcibly organized their memory for forty years was broken up and newly arranged; though the new framework was not clearly articulated yet, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as well as KMT politicians conjured up the ethnic integration of the people in Taiwan, which would finally crystallize into either a “new arising nation” or into a “new Taiwanese” nation. In this process, Taiwan’s Austronesians fulfilled an important role in political and historical as well as in cultural terms: not only could Taiwan’s history now be backdated to a history of eight to ten thousand years, even longer than that of the mainland, but Taiwan’s Austronesian heritage also served as a proof that Taiwan – in cultural and genetic terms – had its own particularity and was much more connected to the Pacific region than to any region to the west of Taiwan.

關鍵字：

臺灣原住民，南島語族，本土文化主義，文化記憶，文化復興，族群，民族主義論述，臺灣史。

摘要：

1996年3月12日，新當選的臺北市長陳水扁宣布，位於總統府前的介壽路改名為凱達格蘭大道。凱達格蘭是在很久以前，被漢族社會同化的一支臺灣原住民族。

有關集體記憶的建構，Jan Assmann 聲稱，經過一個 40 年的周期之後，一個世代的人們因為分享共同經驗，而達到一個關鍵性的階段。在這個周期之後，那些親眼目睹重要事件的人已經成人，逐漸快速離開專業生活。當他們死亡，他們的記憶，或者他們記憶中所形成的社會組織，突然消失不見，而且，某些部分因沒有轉變成為文化記憶，也許就此陷入、或演變成被遺忘的地步。

以臺灣為例，臺灣漢族菁英自 1980 年代末期開始，就展現出重建集體記憶的極大努力，而正好在這幾年間，大陸菁英的記憶開始凋零，使得其他的記憶有機會取代其位置。「臺灣命運共同體」的概念(臺灣反對黨在 1989 年建立的概念)，和由國民黨的臺灣人核心菁英李登輝稍後提出的「臺灣生命共同體」的概念，在 1992 年之後，匯入了一個長期的共同體復興政策中，那是臺灣處於國家認同危機的時期，主要目的在重新使人民認同臺灣，並使人民的原始記憶重組與再現。在這個計畫中，臺灣的所有黨派、族群、農村和城市團體，包括福佬、客家和原住民，都被要求積極參與地方文化生活，組織儀式和慶典，並致力地方文化的保存與口述歷史之搜集。

本文揭露從戒嚴令解除後，記憶重建的過程中，臺灣原住民扮演的腳色。在臺灣，「族群」概念的出現，與「四大族群」的建構，是這項努力的重要進程。藉由將焦點轉離「中國國家」，而放置於區別「文化」和「族群」的架構，人們已經強迫地建立了近四十年的記憶被解構，並重新組合。雖然這個新架構並未明確有力地被表達出來，但民進黨和國民黨的政治人物，喚起了臺灣的民族融合，最後可能會導向如非「新興民族」，

即為「新臺灣人民族」的結果。在這個過程中，臺灣原住民在政治、歷史和文化關係中佔有重要的地位。

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### *Introduction*

When Li Denghui (李登輝) was officially elected president in 1990 and hence reconfirmed in his role as the first Taiwan-born president in Taiwan's history, a profound cultural transformation took place on the island. After four centuries of domination by foreign powers (the Spanish, the Dutch, the Chinese, the Japanese and the Mainlanders (lit.: "people from the external provinces" who had come as refugees from the mainland with Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) after 1945), the issue of the Taiwanese search for identity became a theme of growing significance in the political arena, tolerated now as it did not conflict with Li's endeavour to consolidate his power vis-à-vis the Mainlanders who were still represented in the government and in the military. At the same time, a re-evaluation of Taiwan's relationship to the communist mainland also occurred in an attempt to hinder this development by more and more aggressive challenges to Taiwan's sovereignty and once again emphasizing the cultural and genetic homogeneity of Taiwan's and China's population.<sup>1</sup>

The re-negotiation of cultural identities in Taiwan and the construction of a particular history and culture that differentiated Taiwan from China also had an impact on Taiwan's indigenous population, that – though consisting of at least 12 Malayo-Polynesian groups – makes up no more than 1,6% of the population in Taiwan. For the first time in the history of interaction between Han (漢人) and Non-Han, the languages, cultural traditions and value- and moral systems of ethnic minorities now received attention – an attention that in its final consequence not only involved the official recognition of Taiwan's Aborigines as indigenous people, but that was also accompanied by the implementation of specified cultural institutions. Partly responsible for these political successes were the endeavours of the social movement of Taiwan's Aborigines (*Taiwan Yuanzhumín shehui yundong* 台灣原住民社會運

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<sup>1</sup> Demographically, Hoklo-Chinese (*Minnanren* 閩南人) constitute the majority of the island's population (75%). The so called "Mainlanders" (*waishengren* 外省人), who immigrated from the mainland with Chiang Kai-shek after 1945 and who suppressed Taiwan's population until the lifting of martial law in 1987, make up only 14% of Taiwan's population. Another group of Han-Chinese who settled on Taiwan before the arrival of the Mainlanders are the Hakka (*Kéjiaren* 客家人) (10%). The only Non-Han on Taiwan are the Aborigines (*Yuanzhumín* 原住民), who today comprise no more than 1.6% of the population (Rudolph 2003: 1).

動),<sup>2</sup> a movement that in the years succeeding to its foundation in 1984 had developed rather slowly in its struggle against discrimination and social marginalization, but that after 1990 suddenly received growing respect.

This paper explores the reasons behind the re-evaluation of the status of Aborigines in Taiwan. As I indicated above, endogenous as well as exogenous factors should be considered. While the integration of this group into the political and cultural discourse of Taiwan originally happened only occasionally in the course of “ethnization” that took place during the power struggle between Taiwan’s Han and Taiwan’s Mainlander-Han, it became soon clear that Aborigines – once defined and marked as a distinct ethnic group – could play a decisive role in the process of identity formation of Taiwan’s population, due to the characteristics of “authenticity” and “indignity” that stuck to them. In other words, Aborigines were given a key position in the process of the construction of an over-arching Taiwanese identity and the construction of an alternative cultural memory in Taiwan after 1990.

*Endeavours to reorganize collective memory in Taiwan after the lifting of martial law in 1987*

In his reflections on the structures of collective memory, Jan Assmann (1997) contends that after a period of 40 years, the memory of a generation of people with shared experiences comes to a critical stage. After this period, those who were witnesses to significant events as adults gradually step out of professional life. When they die, their memory – or better: the “social frame” in which their memory was organized – vanishes, and certain aspects that have not been transformed into cultural memory yet may fall into – or may be left to – oblivion.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> The term *Yuanzhumin* – a direct translation from the English term “Ab-origins” – was chosen in 1984 by members of the Aboriginal movement as a substitute for the official term “mountain compatriots”. It took ten years for this new ethnonym to be officially recognized by the second constitutional amendment of June 28, 1994, and two more years until the government yielded to pressure from aboriginal legislators to establish a committee to represent Aborigines on the central level (Rudolph 1996).

<sup>3</sup> Assmann, who works with the theoretical framework of Maurice Halbwachs, divides collective memory into two dimensions: communicative and cultural. The former

If we look at Taiwan, Taiwanese Han elites<sup>4</sup> tried hard to prevent the memory of the Mainlanders, who had ruled Taiwan for over 40 years after the withdrawal of the Japanese, from being transformed into collective memory. In the beginning of the nineties, it became obvious that they tried to influence the formation of collective memory according to their own convictions. This process began exactly in those years when Mainlander elites' memory had begun to wither and memories in Taiwan that had been suppressed for more than 90 years finally had the chance to express and organize themselves again.

Among the most engaged "cultural architects" at that time were the members of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which had been founded in 1986 but only fully legalized in 1989. Most DPP members were of *Hoklo*-origin – i.e., the biggest Han-Chinese group on the island comprising approx. 75% of the total population – and they contended that the Taiwanese had a four-hundred-year-old history on Taiwan.<sup>5</sup> This history included the common experiences of a creative pioneer settler people from South China that developed a particular language and culture after their exodus from China in the 17<sup>th</sup> century and that had endured domination by several foreign powers, every one of whom subjugated Taiwan's population through force. Incidents that were still remembered by the people were the incident of February 28, 1947, as well as the Formosa incident in 1979. It was these facts that constituted the culture of the Taiwanese, and it was these facts that should be mediated in Taiwan's schools, instead of Mandarin, the Yangtze, Peking opera, the Great Wall and the Anti-Japanese War.

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represents the experiences people share with other members of their generation (this kind of memory begins when a generation grows up and ends when it dies), while the latter refers to the condensation of memory into mythical narrations, liturgically repeated and remembered in festivals, rites etc. (Assmann 1997: 50).

<sup>4</sup> I use both "Taiwanese Han" and "Taiwan's Han" to refer to members of the Hoklo- and Hakka-groups, in contrast to "Taiwan's Mainlander-Han".

<sup>5</sup> The concept as well as the slogan of "The 400-years-old history of the Taiwanese" conjured up by supporters of Taiwan-consciousness had its origin in a work by Shi Ming (施明) 1980. Written 1962 in Japan in Chinese, Shi's book was first published in the United States 1980; there has been a legal edition in Taiwan since 1993. Aboriginal intellectuals criticize the work because it does not include the history of Taiwan's Aborigines.

Critics, however, pointed out that the differences articulated in contrast to the mainland culture were in reality minute and surmountable. In addition, there suddenly appeared further groups within Taiwan’s society that tried to make their own claims on Taiwan’s history. A group that showed some discontent with the unilateral request formulated by the Hoklo were Taiwan’s Hakka, another Han-Chinese group in Taiwan whose members counted about 9% of Taiwan’s total population and who had always had difficulties vis-à-vis the Hoklo. In a well-organized “Return our mother-language” movement (*huan wo muyu yundong* 還我母語運動) in 1988, representatives of this group argued that they spoke their own Chinese language and that their ancestors had immigrated to Taiwan at least as early as Taiwan’s Hoklo. Actually, their culture was even closer to the centre of the 5000-years old-Chinese culture (*zhongyuan* 中原) than the culture of most other Han, a fact that should cause Hakka culture to be revered and respected as much as Hoklo culture. What the members of the Hakka-movement failed to realize was that this very “closeness to the ‘*zhongyuan*’” they appealed to had lost much of its former attractiveness by the end of the 1980s; accordingly, their movement did not get much support from Hoklo.

As for Taiwan’s Aborigines, a fourth group of people on the island, their social movement had reached a first climax at the end of the 1980s due to the new political freedoms suddenly enjoyed in Taiwan. Nevertheless, the focus of their movement at that time was not yet directed at the attainment of cultural rights, but against cultural discrimination and social marginalization. In protests against the “myth of Wu Feng” (吳鳳)<sup>6</sup> in Taiwan’s schoolbooks and in demonstrations for the “return of land” seized by Han-Chinese in the course of the previous centuries, aboriginal activists asked the Nationalist (Kuomintang, KMT) government as well as the Han in general to conform to a fairer treatment of the *Yuanzhumin* (原住民) in accordance with internationally-recognized indigenous peoples rights. Only with the approach of constitutional reforms after the election of Li Denghui as president in 1990 did intellectuals and political representatives of this group also begin to concentrate on the question of the status of Aborigines in Taiwan’s society. They

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<sup>6</sup> Wu Feng was a Han merchant in the 17<sup>th</sup> century who is said to have dedicated himself to educate Aborigines and who was in exchange cruelly killed by the former head-hunters.



emphatically pointed to the value of indigenous languages and cultures and to the necessity of ensuring the physical and cultural survival of the Aborigines as a people through implementation of special administrative and educational organs on the central government level and by giving Aborigines a parliamentary status. Especially the supporters of a sovereign Taiwan – to a large degree Hoklo-elites – welcomed the Aboriginal movement very much, as the demands did not obstruct their nationalist aims.

*Adoption of the concept of “ethnic group” in Taiwan*

The willingness to accept the demands of the Aborigines – a people that had previously never been highly valued in Taiwan – was closely related to the perception of these people as a special “ethnic group” in Taiwan.

If we look at the Western understanding of “ethnic group”, we realize that it is a very vague and ambiguous term. In academic texts, “ethnic group” is most commonly defined as a group whose members have a common group-name, a common language, a common myth of descent, and common characteristics in territory, history, culture, and religion, as well as a certain feeling of solidarity that distinguishes them from other groups with whom they interact. It is emphasized that these criteria are subject to continuous change and may also be absent. This means that common genealogical characteristics can in one case play an important role, where in another case they may be only of minor significance or even totally missing. Nevertheless, “ethnic group” today is often used as a euphemism for “race”, and there exists a diffuse understanding that “ethnic group” also includes “racial” similarities. Because of the flood of different definitions, the use of the term “ethnic group” has become increasingly complicated in recent years, and hence today even anthropologists sometimes refuse to use it.

However, things were quite different in Taiwan. Here, the term “ethnic group” was introduced no earlier than the 1980s. Though the Japanese term “*minzoku*” (民族) (“*minzu*” 民族 in Chinese) had long been used to refer to the “Chinese people / nation” (*zhonghua minzu* 中華民族) as well as to “ethnic Chinese” (*hanren minzu* 漢人民族), people in Taiwan did not use the term “*minzu*” for differentiation within Taiwan’s society itself. The only exception

was Taiwan’s Aborigines. For their classification, Taiwan’s anthropologists had adopted the category of the “clan” or “tribe” (*zu* 族) from the Japanese after the World War II. Nevertheless, they had never tried to define or to explain the meaning of “*zu*” in the case of the Taiwan’s Aborigines, nor had there been any attempt to adopt the Western concept of “ethnic group” to classify Taiwan’s Aborigines. After 1980, however, the term “*zuqun*” (族群) was increasingly used to replace “*zu*” in the anthropological literature.

The first person to define “*zuqun*” – a term unknown in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) until the early 1990s – was Xie Shizhong (謝世忠), a representative of Taiwan’s younger generation of anthropologists. After a stay with the Dai in Yunnan, Xie contends in an article on China’s ethnic politics published in 1989, that the main difference between “people/nation” (*minzu*) and “ethnic group” (*zuqun*) in the Chinese context is that a “*minzu*” is usually an etically determined group, that is, a group that has been – in most cases artificially – determined by the state. In contrast, “*zuqun*” is a group that reflects the actual living conditions and the point of view of the analysed. Hence, it is an emically determined group that is authentic and still possesses natural power. On the basis of this understanding, Xie suggests that “*minzu*” should only be used when one talks about a state-determined, juristically defined group of people, while in all other cases one should better use “*zuqun*”.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Xie Shizhong 1995.

Definitions of “*zuqun*” (ethnic group) and “*minzu*” (people/nation) according to Xie Shizhong (1989)

Ethnic group ( <i>zuyi qunti</i> 族裔群體)	Initial nation ( <i>chuqi minzu</i> 初期民族)
A group of individuals living together in natural cohesion	An artificially composed group of individuals
characterized by a primordial and innate feeling of solidarity	lacks a primordial and innate feeling of solidarity
A group of individuals that defines itself on the basis of a subjective feeling to the outside	A group of individuals that has been defined by others (i.e., scholars engaged by the state) on the basis of objective characteristics (language, territory, economic life, mentality)
Emotional joining together	A group that has been composed in the course of scientific classification
A group that also exists in the inner world of its members	A group that exists in the hearts and minds of its creators (i.e., the Chinese scholars that were in charge of the classification in 1955)
An actually existing group	An officially registered group
A group with common interests	A group whose members don't have common social interests
A group with the potential to develop a contemporary ethno-political movement	A group with no latent potential to develop a contemporary ethno-political movement

A less general, more Taiwan-based explanation for the increasing preference for the term “*zuqun*” over “*minzu*” is given by anthropologists of the *Academia Sinica*. They argue that the use of the term “*minzu*” is suitable to distinguish Han and ethnic minorities because of the strong differences of geo-

graphical origin and cultural characteristics; the use of “*minzu*”, however, would make distinctions of different socio-cultural variants and ethnicities of the Han-Chinese of Taiwan difficult. For this reason, the term “*zuqun*” instead of “*minzu*” finally seemed better.

*From the “question of provincial origins” to “Taiwan-consciousness versus China-consciousness”*

These accounts raise the question why people in Taiwan might have felt such an intense need for distinction or demarcation from other Han-Chinese groups. The analysis of Zhang Maogui – a sociologist from *Academia Sinica* – provides us with an insight how the “ethnic question” in Taiwan developed.<sup>8</sup> As Zhang makes clear, distinctions between different groups of Taiwan’s population existed before the lifting of martial law in 1987. But these distinctions were perceived within the category of “provincial origins” (*shengji* 省籍). The most important distinction was made between “people from the external provinces” (*waishengren* 外省人) and the “people from Taiwan Province” (*benshengren* 本省人). The former group, whose members comprised approximately 12% of the island’s population, consisted of Han-Chinese from all provinces on the mainland; the latter group consisted mainly of Hoklo-speakers and Hakka-speakers in Taiwan, who were Han as well and hence were also members of the Sino-Tibetan language family. A further often neglected part of the last mentioned group were the Aborigines, who were called “mountain compatriots” (*shandi tongbao* 山地同胞) and who were divided into at least 12 different groups with distinct languages, all belonging to the Austronesian language family. These different kinds of origins were inscribed on people’s identity cards (origin from one of the mainland provinces existing prior to 1945, or “origin from Taiwan-province”, or “origin from the Mountain-area of Taiwan-province”). While the KMT strictly denied the existence of any ethnically, culturally or socially unequal treatment, this measure guaranteed members of the second and third Mainlander generation in the agnate line privileged access to professions in the military as well as the state and educational sectors (*jūn gōng jiào* 軍公教) until far into the 1980s.

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<sup>8</sup> Chang Mao-kuei 1994.

The first public articulation of essential cultural differences between Taiwanese and Mainlanders occurred in 1983/84 in the course of the dispute on “Taiwan-consciousness” and “China-consciousness”. Those who organized themselves under the banner of “Taiwan-consciousness” now were increasingly concerned about the question how they could abandon their inferior status as a person from “Taiwan-Province”. For them, the label of descent from different “provinces” was not a satisfying criterion anymore – the idea of a “Taiwan nation” or “Taiwanese people” (*Taiwan minzu* 台灣民族) began to take shape at this time, though the open articulation of this idea was still avoided and another concept took its place for the time being.

*The discourse of “Taiwan’s four great ethnic groups” and Taiwan’s Aborigines*

*Gaining the trust of Taiwan’s non-Hoklo electorate*

After it was legalized in 1989, the opposition DPP had to find a way to appeal to those groups in Taiwan who were different in language, culture, social needs and problems and for whom a direct identification with the Hoklo and their understanding of national identity was difficult. Not only Hakka, but also members of the Aboriginal groups were afraid that a sudden seizure of power of those people who called themselves “Taiwanese” would only bring about another period of suppression and domination. In order to convince these groups of the common nationalist project and to win their votes, the DPP introduced the concept of “Taiwan’s four great ethnic groups” (*Taiwan si da zuqun* 台灣四大族群) in 1989. This concept not only emphasized cultural differences, differences in experience and the particularities of the different cultural groups in Taiwan, but also pointed to a multitude of commonalities especially in terms of historical experience.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> The reasons why the DPP regarded fair ethnic politics as essential for Taiwan can be read in the “Policy-White Book” of the DPP of 1993 (Minzhu jinbudang 1993). A chapter entitled “Ethnic and Cultural Politics” first summarizes the negative impacts of the traditional nationalism of “One great China, one Chinese People / Nation” that gave rise to the ruthless sinicization and mandarinization of Taiwan’s people by the KMT. Melting together “Taiwan’s four great ethnic groups” into the abstraction of “one Chinese People/Nation – the Chinese” not only nurtured the PRC’s quest for

*Abandoning the Mainlander-Han focus*

The new concept, however, still had further political functions that went beyond the DPP’s attempts to gain the trust of non-Hoklo groups: it had also the potential to overcome the dichotomy of provincial identity in Taiwan (a dichotomy that had been crystallized in the categories “descent from external provinces” and “Taiwan-province”) in a terminological way. Quite differently from this older terminology, the new term “Taiwan’s four great ethnic groups” no longer suggested that the people on the island just differed in regard to their regional origins in a common nation “China”.<sup>10</sup> On the contrary, it suggested that each of the groups differed from each other in terms of language and culture. From this point on, it proved to be much more difficult to contend that the “cultural entity was congruent with the political entity”.

*Challenge of China’s nationalist discourse*

Additionally, the concept of “Taiwan’s four great ethnic groups” also had an important function in international politics. The idea of the “Chinese nation/people” (*zhonghua minzu*), which suggested a genealogical and cultural relationship of all people in Taiwan and mainland China, could be challenged

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sovereignty over Taiwan, it also was a hindrance to Taiwan’s people’s identification with the state and to ethnic integration of the people on Taiwan, because it caused feelings of superiority and inferiority among the different ethnic groups. Arguing that in a modern and independent state feelings of ethnic superiority and inferiority should not be tolerated nor a single ethnic group be allowed to ensure its own pride and dignity by belittling the values of other groups, the authors then explain that the ethnic and cultural politics planned by the DPP aimed at greater consideration of the special political, economic and cultural needs of all ethnic groups on Taiwan. Here, a special paragraph is dedicated to Taiwan’s Aborigines.

<sup>10</sup> Within the new concept, only the term “ethnic group from the external provinces” (*waisheng zuqun*) still caused some offence, as the category of “province” was still visible here. In 1995, there were attempts to replace the term by “new inhabitants” (*xinzhumin* 新住民).

most successfully by redefining the elements that constituted the “Chinese nation/people” on Taiwan, using a terminology that differed from the PRC-terminology. All people on Taiwan became members of distinct “ethnic groups” (i.e., *waisheng zuqun*, *minnan zuqun*, *kejia zuqun*, *Yuanzhumin zuqun*) – groups that not only spoke different “dialects”, but different “languages” and were obviously of different descent. This included those formerly known as “people from the external provinces” as well as “dialect-groups” (*fangyanqun* 方言群): the “people from Taiwan-province” and the “mountain-compatriots” (*shandi tongbao*: etymologically meaning “mountain dwellers originating from the same uterus”). The earlier terminology had suggested the close interrelationship of these groups before. The new terminology implied patterns of separate descent, a sense that was reinforced by adding the English translation “ethnic group” to the Chinese term “*zuqun*” – as I mentioned above, an extremely ambiguous term in which “descent” and “origin” seemed to play an important role, but which, due to the multitude of different definitions, left open to what degree “racial” criteria were involved. By adding the label “ethnic group” to the Malayo-Polynesian groups whose “genealogical” difference from the Han had been proved by phenotype analysis and other methods of physical anthropology, as well as to those groups whose members had originally come as Han from mainland China to Taiwan, the opaque and ambiguous boundaries between “genealogical” and “non-genealogical” relationships were completely blurred. Even in the case of Taiwan’s Han-dialect-groups the label “ethnic group” now implied some kind of genealogical difference between Hoklo, Hakka, Mainlanders ... and people from the PRC.

At the same time, it was emphasized that members of “Taiwan’s four great ethnic groups” lived together in cultural and genealogical intermixture. Under these conditions, the possibility of their reconstitution in a common “Taiwan nation/people” seemed more possible than ever before.<sup>11</sup> The following explanations of the Hakka Luo Rongguang (羅榮光) – a church minister speaking in favour of Taiwan’s independence at a DPP-conference on the problem of “name-correction in Taiwan” in 1994 – are representative of the discourse described above:

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<sup>11</sup> Nevertheless, the term “*minzu*” was set aside for the time being. When Aboriginal intellectuals attempted to add the label “*minzu*” to their own group (e.g., *Yuanzhu minzu* 原住民族), this endeavour was not much welcomed by Taiwan’s Han intellectuals.

I admit that I'm a Han, my ancestors come from Canton. Hence, I can say that I'm a Han and that I belong to the Han nation / people. However, my ancestors here in Taiwan may very well have a blood relationship with the *Pingpu* aborigines (平埔族). Perhaps I am not a pure Han anymore, I might very well be a new Han who has melted together with the Aborigines ... just a new Han. If we are eager to make ourselves distinguishable from China and from the Chinese, this perspective would be of some help. To call ourselves “new Taiwanese” would aid in our internationally recognized scope of existence as well as a better recognition of our status from the outside. I often explain that the Taiwanese and the Chinese are brothers: They may have the same ancestors ... . On the other hand, I recently heard that in Taidong they once again found another one of Taiwan's original inhabitants who is supposed to have lived here more than 10 thousand years ago. If this is true, this would be much longer ago than the 5000 years since the Yellow Emperor. Thus, it must be evaluated again whether we are really sons and grandsons of the Yellow Emperor (*yanhuang zisun* 炎黃子孫).<sup>12</sup>

Luo's point of view was supported by the findings of several well-known Taiwanese anthropologists. They contended that there were no genocides known in the history of the interaction of Han and Aborigines, which made it very likely that the people in Taiwan really still had the blood of these peoples flowing in their veins.<sup>13</sup>

Nevertheless, the discourse about the significance of Taiwan's Aborigines for the construction of an autonomous Taiwanese identity was not limited to arguments about genealogy and descent. Aborigines were also believed to be important for the reorientation of Taiwan's cultural and historical status. As

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<sup>12</sup> “Taiwan zhumin de zhengming wenti 台灣住民的正名問題 (The name correction problems of Taiwan's inhabitants)”, *Minzhong shibao*, 12.12.1994 (reprint of the record of the conference in the Legislative Yuan on 18.10.1994).

<sup>13</sup> Xie Shizhong 1995: 125; Stainton 1999: 41. Stainton cites an announcement on a Taiwan internet site that points to the alleged genetic fusion of Han and Aborigines. It says: “The majority of Taiwanese are descendants of Austronesians (60%) and only a minor proportion of Taiwanese are descendants of immigrants from mainland China, no matter whether they are speaking Holo, Hakka, Chinese, or English today. This is also supported by recent biological research findings indicating that blood DNA profiles of most Taiwanese are different from those of Chinese.”



Wu Micha (1994), a member of the oppositional organization *Taiwan Association of University Professors* (TAUP), contends in an anthology of the TAUP entitled “Taiwan nationalism”, the Taiwanese should not simply adopt the formula of earlier anti-colonial struggles in order to overcome the internal and external colonialism affecting their island. For however hard they tried, they would not be able to put themselves into antithesis to their colonial suppressors China und Japan by means of reconstruction of a distinct national culture as had been done by former colonies like India. Regardless of whether one talked about such Taiwanese particularities as the Taiwanese puppet show or the Taiwanese opera, once one came to the Mainland province Fujian, one would discover that all these things existed there in a very similar manner. Only by a thorough inclusion of the “nutrient *Yuanzhumin*” (*Yuanzhumin de yangfen* 原住民的養份) – i.e., the inclusion of the different Aboriginal cultures – could Taiwan’s differences from China be clearly demonstrated.<sup>14</sup>

The degree to which Taiwan’s Aborigines were also assigned an important role regarding the construction of a new historical identity of Taiwan became obvious in the fierce struggle against the destruction of archaeological relics sites of the Ketagalan (凱達格蘭).<sup>15</sup> Protests by Taiwan researchers against the destruction of supposed testimonies of Taiwan’s Malayo-Polynesian past first occurred in 1990/91, when the relics site *Shisanhang* (十三行) in the northeast of the island was scheduled to be sacrificed for the construction of a new sewage plant. Though the relics had been discovered as early as the 1950s, they had not been given any attention to for 30 years. Hence the excavation that started in 1988 had not ended until 1990 and still waited for a final evaluation. Though most of the excavated specimens pointed to an earlier settlement of Malayo-Polynesian peoples, coins were also found that dated back to the Tang dynasty (618-905 AD). The coins provoked a fierce dispute among the scholars. While those dedicated to Taiwan-consciousness

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<sup>14</sup> Wu Micha 1994: 119.

<sup>15</sup> The Ketagalan were one of the 25 Aboriginal groups that originally lived on Taiwan. For a long time, it was believed that the Ketagalan had assimilated to Han society, and they were not officially mentioned anymore. But in the early 1990s, their descendants suddenly reappeared: though they could testify their Aboriginal origins by practicing certain rituals, they were no longer able to understand the texts they cited (Rudolph 2003b).

were convinced that the coins must have come to Taiwan through trade with mainland China, another group of scholars argued that the pieces must have been brought along by Taiwan's Aborigines themselves, who (or whose relatives) perhaps still lived on the mainland at that time. Chen Fangming (陳芳明), one of the most important cultural politicians of the DPP, commented on the significance of the excavations of *Shisanhang* for the history of Taiwan in 1991:

The "relics of *Shisanhang*" are cultural relics of the ancestors of the *Pingpu* groups in Taiwan. If one researched these relics, one would discover the cultural truth of the island before the immigration of Han to Taiwan. Such research would not only lead to a correction of the 400-year-old-history of Taiwan that took the Han as its centre, it would also lead to the resurrection of the culture of the *Pingpu*, what might result in a prolongation of Taiwan's history for some thousand years.<sup>16</sup>

The *Shisanhang* site was destroyed in 1991 as a result of the construction of the sewage plant. But the controversy arose again in 1994 when the planned site of the fourth atomic power plant (*Hesi* 核四), also situated in the north of the island, also revealed Ketagalan relics. Groups participating in the struggle against the further destruction of the site this time included not only DPP politicians and Taiwan researchers, but also different members of the Aboriginal movement as well as parts of the environmental movement. When it became clear that sites with Ketagalan relics were endangered by the greed of the big companies as well as by the KMT-government (in which Mainlanders were still influential), the DPP finally resorted to another method to engrave Taiwan's Malayo-Polynesian past into the memory of Taiwan's people. The advocates of Taiwan consciousness and the independence of the island celebrated their greatest triumph on March 12, 1996, when the newly elected Taipei city mayor Chen Shuibian (陳水扁) renamed "*Long live Chiang Kai-shek-Street*" (*Jieshoulu* 介壽路) in front of the presidential palace in Taipei "*Ketagalan Boulevard*" (*Kaidagelan dadao* 凱達格蘭大道). In an article entitled "Is the reason for the "promotion" of the hardly pronounceable street name not clear yet?" the *China Times* comments on the event the following day:

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<sup>16</sup> *China Tribune* 12 (September 9/1991).

The renaming of the “*Long live Chiang Kai-shek-Street*” into “*Ketagalan Boulevard*” by the Taipei city government in a manner that must have annoyed quite a few people, as well as Chen Shuibian’s severe criticism of the opponents as “supporters of the egoistical cultural superiority thinking of the Han-people / nation”, made it clear that the legacy of the KMT was to be abolished. By changing the street name one could instantly break the authority of the new and the old KMT and please socially weak groups like the *Yuanzhumin* that have been neglected by the government for a long time. It further makes clear that if the Taipei city government – at a time when Communist China incessantly emphasizes its unshakeable view of “China’s sovereignty over Taiwan” – uses a name of the *Yuanzhumin*-ethnic groups of the Taipei basin as street name in front of the president’s palace, then the meaning is – on a higher level – to demonstrate the political conviction of the DPP that “Taiwan is Taiwan and China is China” and to make – for the sake of its national status – a demarcation from other political influences. After the renaming, the presidential palace now appears in a light symbolizing the “Taiwanese / Indigenous” (*bentu* 本土) and symbolizing its affiliation to Taiwan.<sup>17</sup>

The sudden rise of significance of Taiwan’s Aborigines for Taiwan’s own, autonomous history can also explain the development of such strange subgroups of the Aboriginal movement as the *China Alliance for Taiwan’s indigenous culture* (*Zhonghua Taiwan Yuanzhuminzu wenhua lianmeng* 中華台灣原住民族文化聯盟): Though the story composed by the self-appointed Ketagalan-descendant and head of the association Li Junzhang (李君章) about the encounter of his ancestors with extraterrestrials 10 thousand years ago can only be called pure imagination, it received some attention within the nativist discourse. However, the amusing story turned rather embarrassing for members of the Aboriginal movement when Li publicly read his manuscript at the 1995-meeting of the *UN-Work Group of Indigenous Peoples* (WGIP).<sup>18</sup>

<sup>17</sup> *China Times* 3.3.1996: 14.

<sup>18</sup> Li Junzhang 1995. Li bases his arguments on a rock painting of the Ketagalan at the *Sandiaoshe* (三貂社) relics site. The painting, which Li calls “*Elohim*”, is supposed to be the image of the “ancestor” of the Austronesian peoples whose common language once upon a time was Ketagalan. According to Li, the Ketagalan painted it as a memorial to the extraterrestrials who came to *Sandiaoshe* many thousand years ago, where they built caves for the people. Only with the help of the extraterrestrials could

*Reamalgamation of “Taiwan’s four great ethnic groups” into “Taiwan’s fate-and-life community”*

Since the discourse of “Taiwan’s great ethnic groups” was suitable to strengthening the position of Taiwan’s Han in general, it soon spread beyond the political opposition. Even within the mainstream-wing of the KMT-government around Li Denghui, it received increasing approval in the early 1990s.<sup>19</sup> Leaders in the KMT-government as well as the DPP were aware that at a time when the homogenising national frame of the “Chinese nation/people” imported by the Mainlanders was being undermined with all its symbols, another solidarity-endowing political concept that would keep the people of Taiwan together and that encourage them to form a new “nation/people” was desirable. A concept that seemed capable of uniting the “four ethnic groups” was “Taiwan’s fate-community” (*Taiwan mingyun gongtongti* 命運共同體). Shortly after its creation by the opposition party in 1990, the term was taken up by President Li Denghui, modified slightly as “Taiwan’s life-community” (*Taiwan shengming gongtongti* 台灣生命共同體). A couple of further directives and slogans of Li Denghui in 1993 and 1994 furthered this trend and intensified the impression that now even the official side appealed to Taiwan’s inhabitants to form an autonomous national community with an autonomous national identity. (Notably, the emphasis on the necessity of a “Management of Great Taiwan and the Construction of a New Centre of Chinese Culture” (*jingying da Taiwan, jianli xin zhongyuan* 經營大台灣, 建立新中原) or the appeal to form a “New Taiwanese” seemed to leave no doubt about Li’s real intention).

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the Ketagalan survive the great flood that engulfed Taiwan 6000 years ago and could spread across the Pacific world.

<sup>19</sup> In the course of the formation of the *New China Party* in 1993, it became evident that even Taiwan’s second- and third generation Mainlander-Han, who had developed an increasing “consciousness of crisis” (*waishengren weiji yiyishi* 外省人危急意識) in the years following Li Denghui’s election, had largely accepted the new categorization: in order to be elected, they called themselves “the party that represented the interests of the “Mainlanders ethnic group” (*waishengren zuqun* 外省族群)” (Zhang Maogui 1996).

Simultaneously, there were changes in the official cultural politics to provide the infrastructural foundation for such a development. Statements made by the minister of the interior and the educational minister in 1993 indicated that the KMT wanted to compensate for its faults in the past and that it was now not only willing to recognize Taiwan's multi-culturality, but that it also wanted to offer opportunities for the further development of the different cultures and languages in Taiwan. Specialists were appointed to work out specific curricula for Hoklo- and Hakka-speakers as well as for Aborigines. Furthermore, long-term-projects were established such as the "Plan for reconstruction of the local communities". The most important aim of this plan was to "diminish the negative results of industrialisation, cultural homogenisation und over-emphasis on individual development and lead people back to a feeling of responsibility towards their fellow-citizens and their community". However, the politicians believed that the latter would not be attainable without the individual's re-identification with the surrounding local culture. The government thus offered funds and resources to encourage all communities in Taiwan – ethnic, rural and urban communities, most of which were either Hoklo, Hakka or Aboriginal – to participate actively in local cultural life, to organize rites and festivals, and to engage in the preservation of local culture and the collection of oral history.<sup>20</sup> As Chen Hua (1998), a historian at Taiwan's National Qinghua University, explains, these efforts "in a time of national identity crisis in Taiwan had the main purpose to refocus people's identity on Taiwan and let the people's original collective memory reorganize and reappear".<sup>21</sup>

*Taiwan as the centre of the Pacific World*

Like the DPP, the KMT-government experienced a profound inner transformation in its interior since the early 1990s, and believed that Aborigines could fulfil symbolic functions to two directions. Domestically, a specific

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<sup>20</sup> The idea officially propagated was "that only through participation in cultural activities in one's own community, could civil consciousness and responsibility be developed and finally be adapted to a national level". However, the activities mentioned surely also served the generating of cultural memory in Assmann's sense.

<sup>21</sup> Chen Hua 1998: 2; 13. In his article, Chen Hua also refers to Halbwachs.

acknowledgement of their existence and cultural achievements could support the development of a new Taiwanese and the construction of a new cultural centre; this also included the perception of their communities as being vested with a strong feeling of solidarity among their members, a condition that had to be protected and that could serve as a model to Taiwan’s Han society. Internationally, however, the protection and fostering of this ethnic minority would not only signify the government’s democratic and multi-cultural attitude, but also a new cultural and political orientation.

This also included a new orientation in Taiwan’s economic policies envisaged by the reformers within the KMT-government and enthusiastically welcomed by the DPP. After travel to the mainland was allowed by Taiwan’s government in 1988, the Chinese mainland, especially southern China increasingly became a favourable place for investment for Taiwan’s enterprises and private investors. For instance, Taiwanese investors in 1990 already provided one-third of the total foreign investment in Fujian Province; in Guangdong Province, Taiwanese investments were second only to Japan’s. Though these new investment opportunities proved to be very advantageous for Taiwan’s industry and commerce, the government pursued a restrictive investment policy after 1988, as it was afraid that Taiwan would become economically dependant on the PRC. Simultaneously, it encouraged investors to become more active in Southeast Asia, where Taiwanese investors had already begun to make good profits. In Malaysia, for instance, Taiwan, with 24,7% of the total amount of foreign investment, was second to Japan and in Thailand 10% of all foreign investments were Taiwanese. After Li Denghui travelled to several Southeast Asian countries in early 1994 to reinforce economic contacts, the so-called “Southbound-Policy” (*nanxiang zhengce* 南向政策) began to take shape. At the same time, the ambitious plan of Li Yuanzhe (李原哲) – the new head of the Academia Sinica – to make Taiwan a research centre for the history Southeast Asia became public. As a part of this project, researchers at the Academia Sinica had already begun to conduct DNA analysis of Malayo-Polynesian peoples in New Guinea and on Taiwan.<sup>22</sup>

The most important support for the claims to Taiwan being part of the Pacific world came from Peter Bellwood, a well-known Australian linguist. In

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<sup>22</sup> Chen Guangxing 1994: 167. Chen here analyses to what degree cultural discourses supported the government’s economic interests in Taiwan in the early 1990s.

an article in *Scientific American* in July 1991, Bellwood confirmed Isidore Dyen's 1963 hypothesis that Taiwan was the origin of all peoples of the Austronesian language family (*nandao yuxi minzu* 南島語系民族). This hypothesis declared that the so-called "Proto-Austro-Tai" had departed from the extreme south of Mainland China many thousands of years ago and settled on Taiwan, where they formed the Austronesian language family about 6000 years ago. Shortly afterwards, the first groups of Austronesians began to spread out among the Southeast Pacific islands; to the east, they spread as far as New Guinea, Hawaii, New Zealand and to the Easter Islands, and to the west as far as Madagascar. Attached to the article was a map that emphasized the autonomous development of the Austronesian peoples on Taiwan by means of a thick black line that separated Taiwan from China; arrows showed how different waves of Austronesians had left Taiwan and moved to the Southeast Pacific. The revelations of the article as well as the map immediately attained extreme popularity in the circles of the supporters of Taiwan-consciousness: Through the application of Bellwood's views, Taiwan not only gained a position as a member, but a central position in the newly conjured Pacific sphere.

#### *Reaction of the PRC*

Of course, the "Austronization" that seized Taiwan since the early 1990s did not remain unnoticed in the PRC. The new kind of nationalist discourse in Taiwan that referred to the hybridity of Taiwan's inhabitants and that hence remained implicit in the discourse of "race", was now countered with arguments stressing "racial origins".<sup>23</sup> For instance, an article entitled "Evidence of the genealogical (*xueyuan* 血緣) origin of Taiwan's *Yuanzhumin*" in the foreign edition of *People's Daily* on 16.2.1996 pointed to new archaeological findings, according to which the so-called *gaoshanzu* groups (高山族) had

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<sup>23</sup> Nationalists in China as well as in Taiwan harboured the common conviction that claims on territory could be better promoted if it could be proved that the people who lived on the territory in question stemmed from the "same uterus" (*tongbao* 同胞). Accordingly, they also concurred in the conviction that claims on territory would be difficult to promote if the "fact of common genealogical and cultural origin" that had been constantly emphasized was refuted.

originally come from the mainland and partly even from northern -China to Taiwan and hence must have been Chinese.<sup>24</sup> The author of the article enthusiastically contended that these findings should also have a direct impact on the important national question of reunification of Taiwan and China. In his introduction to the article, he remarks:

The question about the genealogical (lit.: blood-relationship) origin of the earlier inhabitants (*xianzhumin* 先住民)<sup>25</sup> of Taiwan has always caught public attention. Dr. Hou Jinfeng – Mongolian and one of the representatives of genealogical anthropology of our country who just recently returned from a research stay in Japan – has confirmed after many years of scientific research that the genetic (*yichuan* 遺傳) distance in the blood-relationship between the groups of people in Taiwan and those on the mainland is extremely close, and most of them stem from the Miao- and Yao-nationalities from the mainland. Hence, the discourse on the question where Taiwan belongs to now has an even more profound scientific foundation and consolidation.<sup>26</sup>

### Conclusion

Since the early 1990s, Taiwan’s Aborigines have suddenly received attention again. On the one hand, this stemmed from Taiwan’s efforts to demonstrate democratic developments to a domestic as well as foreign audience. On the other hand, Taiwanese Han elites in the DPP as well as in the KMT increasingly realized the necessity of ethnic, cultural and historical particularity for the construction of an autonomous, independent Taiwanese identity, and by

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<sup>24</sup> “*Gaoshanzu*” is the term that was used in Taiwan’s academic circles for Taiwan’s Aborigines until the “Name correction movement of Taiwan’s *Yuanzhumin*” in the early 1990s (at that time, most scholars switched to “*Yuanzhumin*”). “*Gaoshanzu*” includes all the different groups of Aborigines with their different languages and often deals with them as one group (much as “*Yuanzhumin*” stands for one of four ethnic groups in Taiwan). In the PRC, most people still use the term “*Gaoshanzu*” rather than “*Yuanzhumin*”, because “*Gaoshanzu*” is one of the 56 officially determined “nationalities” (*minzu*) in China.

<sup>25</sup> “*Xianzhumin*” was one of the terms used by the opponents of the term “*Yuanzhumin*” in Taiwan before the constitutional rectification of the ethnomym in 1994.

<sup>26</sup> Wang Xiaohui 1996: 5.



making the “*Yuanzhumin*” – little more than 1% of Taiwan’s total population – visible as one of “Taiwan’s four great ethnic groups”, they became a touchstone for the democratic development of Taiwanese politics. The way they were treated indicated how social and cultural minorities who were not Hoklo-speakers would be treated in the future. Furthermore, the Aborigines – a group that was defined as genealogically distinct from the Han and that carried a multitude of cultural traditions that were totally different from the Chinese culture and tradition – testified most impressively the absurdity of the myth of the homogeneity of Taiwan’s population that had been claimed by the Mainlander-KMT as well as by the CCP, and highlighted an independent Taiwanese history that was over six-thousand-years-old and characterized by the interactions and intermixture of a multitude of different ethnic groups and cultures. As “cultural architects” in Taiwan contended, it was these memories, experiences and cultural condensations that were supposed to flow into the people’s collective memory.<sup>27</sup> For the first time in Taiwan’s history, there seemed to be the possibility of allowing these different memories to communicate and reconcile.<sup>28</sup>

Special historical and external conditions, however, prevented that the memories of all groups of people in Taiwan from being treated equally. For instance, President Li Denghui in 1994 appealed to Taiwan’s people to integrate certain characteristics of Aboriginal cultures – parts of their clothing, cuisine and architecture – into the main culture.<sup>29</sup> Similar suggestions were rarely heard with regard to the cultures of the Mainlanders or the Hakka. After all, the formation of collective memory in post-martial-law Taiwan was

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<sup>27</sup> In terms of theory, the intellectual architects of this movement were very much aware of the significance of their efforts, as books entitled “Creation of Taiwan’s New Culture” showed at the time (Zhang Yanxian 1993).

<sup>28</sup> During the Qing period (on Taiwan: 1683-1895), Taiwan’s different populations were still too separated from each other to form a common collective memory. As for the Japanese colonial rule (1895-1945), this period was too short to allow communicative memory to develop the correspondences and condensations of cultural memory; hence, there also was not enough time for the formation of a lasting collective memory.

<sup>29</sup> Wu Yaofeng 1994. Wu was the head of the personnel department of the provincial government in 1994. Wu’s article “Excavation of the cultural resources of the *Yuanzhumin*” contains a detailed evaluation of those parts of Aboriginal culture that might be of some value to the Han.

subordinate to Taiwanese nationalism – itself a reaction to the Chinese nationalism of the KMT as well as that of the CCP – that tried to underline Taiwan’s right to be recognized as a nation in a world of nations by pointing to the particularities of Taiwan. The dynamics inherent to this process, which also had an impact on smaller segments of the society (e.g., on other ethnic groups), remind us of Immanuel Wallerstein’s (1984) remark,

the nationalisms of the modern world are the ambivalent expression of the desire ... for assimilation to the universal ... and the attachment to the particular, the rediscovery of differences. It is a universalism through particularism and a particularism through universalism.<sup>30</sup>

This paper has only dealt with Taiwan’s Aborigines in Taiwan’s recent political and cultural discourses. As for Taiwan’s Aboriginal people themselves, we do not yet know whether the re-evaluation of their cultures and languages will have positive or negative effects on the people. While ordinary members of Aboriginal society in the mid-1990s usually still took a rather sceptical stance towards the new development, young intellectuals of Aboriginal society and Han society often acted as moderators in the process described. Especially those elements that pointed to the particularity of Taiwan’s Aborigines – including many aspects that were avoided by ordinary people and that were not openly referred to, for instance the former headhunting practices and tattooing culture or the traditional naming practices<sup>31</sup> – were now newly staged and – equipped with the label of “authenticity” – presented to the whole Chinese-speaking world by making use of the multi-medial capacities of the internet.<sup>32</sup> As I have argued before, democratic ideals could be

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<sup>30</sup> Wallerstein 1984: 166 (quotation from Stuart Hall 1994: 204).

<sup>31</sup> Examples that can be named here are the “Headhunting Culture Raid” of Aboriginal intellectuals at the *Yuanzhumin Culture Congress* in 1994 (Rudolph 1996) as well as the demands for the revitalization of Aboriginal languages and traditional individual names. In the latter case, Aboriginal elites requested that the revitalization should be more actively supported by the government, for instance by officially ordaining the rehabilitation of names. Such a practice, however, would not be advantageous for everybody in Aboriginal society. If we look at the situation of the Paiwan or Rukai, for instance, the class differences that are petrified in the traditional personal and family names would become visible again, a clear disadvantage for the lower-class members of these groups.

<sup>32</sup> See for instance the website “The Tattooing Culture Atelier” published by the Taroko Tian Guishi in 1996.

easily undermined at this point. My fieldwork in Taiwan in the years 1994-96 showed that not everybody in Aboriginal society wanted to be visible to the outside; likewise, not everybody longed for the restoration of certain cultural traditions that would re-establish inequality within their respective groups.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Rudolph 2003a, 2003b, 2004.

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