Title
Intuition and Conceptual Construction in Weyl’s Analysis of the Problem of Space
Abstract
Hermann Weyl adopted the Kantian definition of space as a form of intuition and referred to Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological approach for the philosophical characterization of space in the introduction to Raum-Zeit-Materie (1918) and other writings from the same period (1918–1923). At the same time, Weyl emphasized that subjective factors are completely excluded from the mathematical construction of physical reality in Albert Einstein’s general theory of relativity, with the sole exception of the setting of a coordinate system, which for Weyl is what remains of the original perspective of the self in becoming aware of one’s own intuitions. This paper reconsiders Weyl’s philosophical position as a possible response to the earlier debate on the relation between intuition and conceptual construction in the foundation of geometry, key figures of which, besides Husserl, included Hermann von Helmholtz, Felix Klein, and Moritz Schlick.
Keywords
Classical and relativistic problems of spaceForm of intuitionHermann von HelmholtzHermann Weyl
Object type
Language
English [eng]
Persistent identifier
https://phaidra.univie.ac.at/o:1049650
Is contained in
Title
Weyl and the Problem of Space
From Science to Philosophy
Editor
Julien Bernard
Carlos Lobo
Series
Title
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
Volume
49
From page
347
To page
368
Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Version type
Date available
2020-10-11
Date accepted
2019-10-10
Access rights

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