Titel
Eliminating Group Agency
Abstract
Aggregating individuals’ consistent attitudes might produce inconsistent collective attitudes. Some groups therefore need the capacity to form attitudes that are irreducible to those of their members. Such groups, group-agent realists argue, are agents in control of their own attitude formation. In this paper, however, I show how group-agent realism overlooks the important fact that groups consist of strategically interacting agents. Only by eliminating group agency from our social explanations can we see how individuals vote strategically to gain control of their groups and produce collective attitudes we cannot make sense of if we treat groups as agents.
Stichwort
Attitude aggregationdiscursive dilemmagroup agencymicro-foundationsstrategic voting
Objekt-Typ
Sprache
Englisch [eng]
Persistent identifier
https://phaidra.univie.ac.at/o:1409132
Erschienen in
Titel
Economics and Philosophy
ISSN
0266-2671
Erscheinungsdatum
2021
Seitenanfang
1
Seitenende
24
Verlag
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Erscheinungsdatum
2021
Zugänglichkeit
Rechteangabe
© The Author(s), 2021

Herunterladen

Universität Wien | Universitätsring 1 | 1010 Wien | T +43-1-4277-0