Title
Why We Need a New Normativism about Collective Action
Author
Javier Gomez-Lavin
University of Pennsylvania, USA
Abstract
What do we owe each other when we act together? According to normativists about collective action, necessarily something and potentially quite a bit. They contend that collective action inherently involves a special normative status amongst participants, which may, for example, involve mutual obligations to receive the concurrence of the others before leaving. We build on recent empirical work whose results lend plausibility to a normativist account by further investigating the specific package of mutual obligations associated with collective action according to our everyday understanding. However, our results cast doubt on a proposed obligation to seek the permission of co-actors before exiting a collective action, and suggest instead that this obligation is a function of explicit promising. We then discuss how our results pave the path for a new normativism, a theory that neither under- nor over-shoots the target given by our common conception of the interpersonal obligations present in collective action.
Keywords
shared agencycollective intentioncollective actioninterpersonal obligationjoint commitment
Object type
Language
English [eng]
Persistent identifier
https://phaidra.univie.ac.at/o:1429388
Appeared in
Title
The Philosophical Quarterly
ISSN
0031-8094
Issued
2021
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date issued
2021
Access rights
Rights statement
© The Author(s) 2021

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