Titel
Social virtue epistemology and epistemic exactingness
Autor*in
Abstract
Who deserves credit for epistemic successes, and who is to blame for epistemic failures? Extreme views, which would place responsibility either solely on the individual or solely on the individual’s surrounding environment, are not plausible. Recently, progress has been made toward articulating virtue epistemology as a suitable middle ground. A socio-environmentally oriented virtue epistemology can recognize that an individual’s traits play an important role in shaping what that individual believes, while also recognizing that some of the most efficacious individual traits have to do with how individuals structure their epistemic environments and how they respond to information received within these environments. I contribute to the development of such an epistemology by introducing and elucidating the virtue of epistemic exactingness, which is characterized by a motivation to regulate the epistemically significant conduct of others.
Stichwort
Assertionself-respectsocial epistemologypowertestimonyvirtue reliabilismvirtue responsibilism
Objekt-Typ
Sprache
Englisch [eng]
Persistent identifier
Erschienen in
Titel
Episteme
ISSN
1742-3600
Erscheinungsdatum
2025
Seitenanfang
1
Seitenende
16
Publication
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Erscheinungsdatum
2025
Zugänglichkeit
Rechte
Rechteangabe
© The Author(s), 2025
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