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Titel
Korsgaard’s Constitutivism and the Possibility of Bad Action
Abstract
Neo-Kantian accounts which try to ground morality in the necessary requirements of agency face the problem of “bad action”. The most prominent example is Christine Korsgaard’s version of constitutivism that considers the categorical imperative to be indispensable for an agent’s self-constitution. In my paper I will argue that a constitutive account can solve the problem of bad action by applying the distinction between constitutive and regulative rules to the categorical imperative. The result is that an autonomous agent can violate the categorical imperative in so far as it amounts to a regulative rule of morality; however, an agent cannot call into question the categorical imperative as a constitutive rule of the practice of morality without losing her or his identity as a moral agent. The paper then compares this approach to bad action with the one Korsgaard provides and outlines also a new way of grounding the categorical imperative.
Stichwort
ConstitutivismThe categorical imperative (as a constitutive rule and a regulative rule)Justification of the categorical imperativeBad action
Objekt-Typ
Sprache
Englisch [eng]
Persistent identifier
https://phaidra.univie.ac.at/o:691462
Erschienen in
Titel
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Band
21
Ausgabe
1
Seitenanfang
37
Seitenende
56
Verlag
Springer Nature
Projektnummer
Distortions of Normativity No 249377 – European Union (all programmes)
Erscheinungsdatum
2017
Zugänglichkeit
Rechteangabe
© The Author(s) 2017

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