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Titel
An alternative norm of intention consistency
Abstract
In this paper, I formulate a norm of intention consistency that is immune to the kind of cases that have been put forth to argue either that rationality does not require consistency between an agent's intentions, or that, if it does, then rationality is not normative. The norm I formulate mimics refinements that have been made to the norm of means‐end coherence in response to cases where, intuitively, you need not be irrational when you intend an end e, despite not intending the means m you believe to be necessary for e, because you do not believe that intending m is necessary for e. Similarly, according to the norm I put forth, if you intend e, and believe that e is inconsistent with e*, you need not be irrational if you also intend e*, as long as you do not believe that intending e* is inconsistent with e.
Stichwort
Philosophie
Objekt-Typ
Sprache
Englisch [eng]
Persistent identifier
https://phaidra.univie.ac.at/o:1079614
Erschienen in
Titel
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy
Seitenanfang
1
Seitenende
8
Verlag
Wiley
Projektnummer
740922 – European Union (all programmes)
Erscheinungsdatum
2020
Zugänglichkeit
Rechteangabe
© 2020 The Author

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