In our presentation, we investigate the commonalities between Wittgenstein’s account of sensation and recent accounts of the “minimal self” and its definition as “mineness” of experience. These recent accounts hold that “mineness” is characterized, (1) by a difference between the way I access my sensations as opposed to how others can access them and (2) by the experiential givenness of the self. We argue that Wittgenstein agrees with the first claim and that he holds that sensations are in a sense had by one person. Nevertheless, he implies that, if the determinate quality of a sensation conditions the meaning of a word in a language, that quality is intersubjective. With regard to the claim of experiential givenness, we argue that Wittgenstein would be unlikely to find a common kind of experience in all uses of the first-person pronoun, but that he may find resemblances between some uses.