Titel
Complicity and Conditions of Agency
Abstract
In his ground‐breaking study Complicity, Christopher Kutz introduces the notion of ‘participatory intentions’ (individual intentions whose content is collective) to explain an agent's complicity with groups or organisations. According to Kutz, participatory intentions allow us to hold individuals morally accountable for collective wrongs independent of their causal contribution to the wrong and its ensuing harm. This article offers an alternative account of complicity. Its central claim is that an agent's complicity might be due to the dependence of his professional role on the normative principles that make up the organisation or institution in whose practices he partakes. In other words, there might arise a constitutive failure in an agent's attempt to ascribe to himself a non‐complicit professional identity. I use the case of SS‐Judge Konrad Morgen in order to illustrate this understanding of complicity.
Stichwort
Philosophy
Objekt-Typ
Sprache
Englisch [eng]
Persistent identifier
https://phaidra.univie.ac.at/o:912277
Erschienen in
Titel
Journal of Applied Philosophy
Band
35
Ausgabe
4
Seitenanfang
643
Seitenende
660
Verlag
Wiley
Erscheinungsdatum
2018
Zugänglichkeit
Rechteangabe
© 2018 The Author

Herunterladen

Universität Wien | Universitätsring 1 | 1010 Wien | T +43-1-4277-0